Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia — Claim and Reality by Wöhler-Khalfallah, Khadija Katja
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1 In a Caliphate the Caliph, the head of the Muslim 
community, sees himself as the Prophet’s successor, 
yet he is only entitled to wield secular power over his 
subjects. He must ensure that the community lives
1. Introduction
Book titles such as “The massive offensive to wipe out 
the religion of democracy” (Ben Hadj 1990) or “Warning 
to the inattentive and notification to the undecided that 
reintroduction of the Caliphate is one of the main duties 
of this religion”1 (Ben Hadj n. d.), contrasting with state-
ments such as “Islam is the true democracy” (El-Difraoui 
1994, 121), “Islam stands for a just order of society” (cf. 
inter alia Qutb 1993 and Carré and Michaud 1983, 105) and 
“Islam stands for a democracy that not only pays heed to 
the human dignity of its own population but concedes this 
right to all people, including across borders” (Ghannouchi 
1993, 87) testify on the one hand to a religious system as 
one point of reference and on the other to an ambivalent 
link with democracy.
Yet the fundamentalists juxtapose concepts that ought 
not really to be comparable. Islam is without doubt a 
religion, while democracy is not. Though the latter in its 
liberal form is able to assign religions to private life, it is 
first and foremost a construct designed to stop despotism 
and abuse of power. Thus fundamentalists use concepts 
that, while they may suggest a great deal and arouse ex-
pectations, are anything but unambiguous and therefore 
require definition.
This article will show that when fundamentalists talk 
about “democracy” they mean at best a limited democ-
racy that only serves the purpose of establishing opinions 
within a group that subscribes to the same basic idea 
while denying other groups the right to exist. As a rule it 
This article discusses democratic elements in early Islamic sources and in the programs of the Algerian FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) and ANNAHDA in 
Tunesia. According to historic writings, Islam includes the principles of democratic consensus, consultation, and freedom of opinion, and an understand-
ing that the sources of Islamic jurisdiction are subject to interpretation, that the sharia can be changed, and that religious authorities’ power to issue in-
structions on worldly matters is limited. These are the type of expectations that fundamentalist parties arouse when they speak of an Islamic caliphate 
as a state system. Against this background, an examination of the political system proposed until 1992 by the Algerian FIS shows that this system would 
have resulted in a very restrictive form of Islam. An investigation of the political system of the Tunisian fundamentalist leader Rached al-Ghannouchi 
reveals that the system he proposes may be designated as an Islamic democracy, since it takes into account separation of powers and pluralism of po-
litical parties. The head of state would be subject to the law in the same manner as the people. However, it is no liberal democracy, as he categorically 
rejects secularism, intends to punish apostates, and is only willing to allow political parties that are based on the religion of Islam. His state would only 
be a state of those citizens who follow Islam, completely neglecting secularist groups. Social conflicts and unrest are thus predetermined. 
in compliance with the religion, but his religious role 
cannot be compared with that of the Pope in Chris-
tianity. Theoretically, the Caliph is just as much 
subject to Islamic law as the community he leads.
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is reduced to a mere election mechanism stripped of its 
actual purpose, which is to limit abuse of power. More-
over, it may not be apparent either to other, nonreligious 
parties or to potential voters that when fundamentalists 
talk about democracy in general they do not necessarily 
mean liberal democracy in the sense of freedom of reli-
gion, political pluralism, equal rights, legal certainty, and 
division of powers. It is important to ascertain what kind 
of democracy is at stake because, contrary to what is often 
assumed in the West, societies in countries with a major-
ity Muslim population are very heterogeneous, be it in 
their political alignments or in their religious affiliations. 
Consequently, social peace in those countries would only 
be ensured if all were really to be assured of equal funda-
mental rights and of equal entitlement to participate in 
politics. When a fundamentalist leader such as Rached al-
Ghannouchi, a Tunisian celebrated in the West as a liberal, 
makes media attention-grabbing statements that suggest 
he supports laicism, that feeds expectations and generates 
trust among political opponents. For instance, he once 
said: “We entered the political arena in Tunisia to fight for 
freedoms and not to establish an Islamic state. . . .  We must 
respect the will of the masses if they decide to choose a 
different path from ours. We are not people’s guardians. 
Consequently, if our society were to opt one day to become 
atheist or even communist, what could we do?” (el-Af-
fendy 1987). He thus lays down liberal democracy as the 
yardstick for the political system he proposes, and must be 
measured by that yardstick.
Likewise, talk of “Islam” is not unambiguous. A look at the 
history of the Islamic world shows that it has gone through 
various epochs of religious interpretation, ranging from 
decidedly liberal, tolerant, and secular (e.g. during the Ab-
basid dynasty in the East or under the Moors in Andalu-
sia) to puritanical, backward-looking, anti-development, 
and intolerant (e.g. in Saudi Arabian Wahhabism). Pres-
ent-day fundamentalists’ claim to be acting in accordance 
with “Islamic teaching” howsoever they interpret it is often 
accepted at face value without any critical analysis. To 
examine the political goals of fundamentalist parties it is 
not enough to consult the source texts of Islamic religion. 
One must also refer to the published political program 
or the publications of the groups in question. Max Weber 
concluded that the special interpretations applied by some 
particularly ascetic forms of Protestantism such as Calvin-
ism, Pietism, and Methodism were conducive to the emer-
gence of a special form of capitalism (Weber 1993, 53) only 
after he had studied the interpretations of the respective 
groups with a view to identifying in them the values that 
led to a particular behavior, rather than basing his views 
only on the Bible as the foundation of Protestant, Catholic, 
and Orthodox Christian interpretations.
This article will examine the political system proposed 
by the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation 
Front) in Algeria and ANNAHDA (Renaissance) in 
Tunisia in the light of their own claims to be committed 
to a democratic system. This analysis is being undertaken 
because many of their followers and many traditional 
Muslims assume that Islam stands for the realization of 
true democracy and one must therefore assume that those 
claims will have aroused corresponding expectations 
among the fundamentalists’ supporters. In addition, it is 
important to ascertain the fundamentalists’ willingness 
to be measured in fair competition with the other political 
and intellectual movements in their respective societies, 
since that is the fundamental prerequisite for ensuring 
social peace.
2. Democratic Elements in Islam and in its Early History
Confusion among western academics, especially as re-
gards the FIS, can be explained by contradictory propa-
ganda. On the one hand Ali Ben Hadj, the more populist 
of the FIS’s two leaders, has written books and newspa-
per articles with titles such as “The massive offensive to 
wipe out the religion of democracy” and “Warning to the 
inattentive and notification to the undecided that reintro-
duction of the Caliphate is one of the main duties of this 
religion.” On the other, the FIS called for a democratic 
contest in order to come to power, even promising to allow 
Muslims to elect its leaders in future.
Interviews conducted by Abdelasiem El-Difraoui (1994) 
for his report on the FIS and its critical stance toward 
democracy show that the FIS deliberately relies on the 
ignorance of its followers and their hazy ideas. He ques-
tioned around thirty FIS supporters and found among 
them almost without exception great confusion concern-
ing the political conceptualities and a widespread inabil-
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ity to distinguish between an Islamic and a democratic 
order. The majority even equated the two systems. Thus 
an unemployed nineteen-year-old from the Algiers casbah 
(old city) said, “I’m opposed to democracy because it’s a 
western invention. It isn’t Islamic. I support the FIS , so I 
support the shura2.” Asked what the shura was, the same 
respondent said, “The shura is Islamic. It means that the 
people can decide their own destiny” (El-Difraoui 1994, 
121). Ali Ben Hadj, the second leader of the FIS, holds a 
completely different view from that young man, at least 
on that particular point. He believes the people are too 
ignorant to identify suitable representatives who have their 
eye on quality and the long-term good (El-Difraoui 1994, 
114). Another sympathizer interviewed even said, “Only 
a FIS government will establish true democracy, because 
Islam is true democracy.” (El-Difraoui 1994, 121) The state-
ment given by a twenty-five-year-old bookkeeper in this 
connection is revealing. He voted FIS less out of convic-
tion than as an act of protest, in order to get rid of the 
FLN (Front de Libération National), Algeria’s dictatorial 
post-colonial unity party, which was heavily influenced 
by the military. He said, “I’m pro-FIS because I’ve had it 
up to here after thirty years of the FLN and I can’t earn a 
living. So I’m 100 percent behind the FIS. But all that will 
come of it is the sharia.3 That’s bound to be a bit too severe 
for us young people” (El-Difraoui 1994, 121).
Many Muslims fail to identify the invocation of a Caliph-
ate as a call for a theocratic dictatorship because some of 
the conceptualities used do have democratic features. It 
should be noted that the fundamentalists invoke espe-
cially the idealized Caliphate of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
first four successors. Most politically and historically 
uneducated Muslims regard that as the period when true 
democracy was born. All four Caliphs were chosen to lead 
the Muslims by the unanimous consent of tribal chief-
tains. The great Sunni theologian al-Imam Abu Hamid 
al-Ghazali, 1058 – 1111, noted back in the eleventh century 
that only election by the umma conferred legitimacy on 
the person who held supreme state power (Meier 1994, 
507). Omar, the Muslims’ second Caliph, had this to say 
on the subject: “He who renders obeisance (bai’a) to a 
man without consultation (maswara) with Muslims has 
rendered no obeisance, nor has he to whom it was ren-
dered received any obeisance” (Meier 1994, 507). One can 
also cite the following rhetorical question posed by Imam 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbalite school of law: 
“Do you know who the imam is? The imam is the man all 
Muslims have agreed on. He is the imam” (Meier 1994, 507).
The principle of shura (consultation) also has democratic 
features. According to Hamid Sulaiman, it is that the 
circle of those involved in drafting an order or a law of 
public interest should be drawn as widely as possible 
(Meier 1994, 511).
One can find arguments in Islamic religious sources (the 
Koran and the sayings and deeds of the Prophet) in sup-
port of freedom to form and develop attitudes and opin-
ions on questions of pure dogma, too. Thus it is said that 
the founder of the Malikite school of law refused to have 
the Caliph promote his school of law to the only valid legal 
standard, arguing that the existence of different opinions 
was a blessing for Muslim people (Ramadan 1980, 81).
Likewise, contrary to the view widely held in Europe, the 
sharia is not a rigid legal canon that must remain un-
changed through the centuries. The sources of Islamic 
jurisdiction should be seen rather as moral and ethical 
guidelines to be adapted to circumstances as they evolve. 
Islamic philosophy itself shows that some earlier inter-
pretations were wrong because, while God has foresight, 
human beings are still too backward in their develop-
ment. In his “Reconstruction of Religious Thought in 
Islam,” Iqbal observes that the principles of the Koran by 
no means prohibit human thought and legislative activ-
ity. Instead, he says, in spirit they in fact prompt people to 
think. Early Islamic scholars mainly used this foundation 
as a starting point for developing a series of legal systems. 
Although these legal systems are very comprehensive they 
are nothing but individual interpretations and can there-
fore lay no claim to conclusiveness. This follows from the 
2 Consultation by the head of the Muslim com-
munity. Traditionally, this was never a binding 
requirement.
3 Islamic law
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Koran teaching that life is an ongoing process of creation 
(Ramadan 1980, 57).
Ali Abdarraziq, 1888–1966, who worked at a sharia court 
in Egypt, several decades ago reached the conclusion that 
no-one has the right to curtail people’s freedom of choice. 
He argued that the Caliphate is not only unnecessary but 
even contrary to the essence of the Islamic message. He 
was able to prove that even the Prophet was not granted 
political power over Muslims and did not lay claim to 
such power. Abdarraziq cites five verses from the Koran, 
commenting that it states clearly that Mohammed had no 
rights over his community beyond his religious revelations 
(Meier 1994, 112). The sole authority the Prophet had over 
his people was a spiritual authority, the origin of which is 
heartfelt belief. Consequently, obedience to him is based 
on a purely spiritual origin from which physical obedi-
ence follows. In contrast, the secular ruler’s authority is 
a material authority. “The former belongs to religion, the 
latter to the world. The former is God’s business, the lat-
ter the business of human beings. The former is based on 
the religious principle of guidance, the latter on political 
leadership” (Meier 1994, 109).
If Ali Abdarraziq denies even the Prophet political power 
over people, then all the more so the Caliph. In his view, 
religion did not envisage a Caliphate, jurisdiction, or any 
other state or government departments. These are subject 
only to the judgment of reason and experience. Accord-
ingly, nothing prevents an Islamic society from construct-
ing its polity on the basis of new forms of state (Meier 1994, 
114). This proposition can certainly be taken to mean that 
in the final analysis a human being is obligated only to 
God and that no-one may claim the right to denounce his 
decision or to impose worldly punishment for it. In other 
words, it can be taken to mean that human beings alone 
are responsible for deciding for or against God without 
having to fear worldly persecution. One might also deduce 
from this proposition that Islam as a religion would even 
be capable of tolerating liberal democracy.
The above examples are intended to give an indication of 
the expectations awakened in supporters of fundamental-
ist parties when people talk about an Islamic Caliphate as 
a system of state. In addition, the Islamic religion is agreed 
to incorporate a high degree of social justice. For instance, 
it bans corruption, usury, enrichment of the few at the cost 
of others, and the exploitation of labor, from all of which 
people in most Muslim countries have to suffer on account 
of those countries’ dictatorships.
Before we move on to the extent to which the FIS and 
ANNAHDA are capable of democracy or are utilizing the 
most liberal interpretation possible of Islam, it should be 
pointed out that a distinction should be drawn between 
democracy and liberal democracy. The former meets the 
standard of introducing a fair decision-making process in 
a group that aspires to one and the same goal by different 
means. The latter permits all life concepts in a society a 
role in shaping politics, provided that there is none among 
them with the goal of swapping the free, democratic 
constitutional basis agreed by the majority for a dicta-
torship. In this context, liberal democracy is an entirely 
relevant standard for comparison against the ideas of state 
of fundamentalist parties, because the heterogeneous 
nature of society in many countries with majority Islamic 
populations makes state-guaranteed equality of differ-
ent life concepts an essential prerequisite for social peace. 
Alongside religious Muslims, other large groups such as 
Christians, Jews, laicists, socialists and atheists exist even 
in these societies.
3. The FIS’s Ideas on the State
Far from having a clear line, the FIS is an umbrella orga-
nization in which different currents have come together, 
all of which claim a connection in some form with Islam. 
Nonetheless, one can identify and highlight three basic 
orientations, the Algerianists, the moderate Salafis and the 
radical Salafis. This alone is a highly explosive combina-
tion, given that Algerianists and Salafis practice diametri-
cally opposed interpretations of religion.
The Algerianist leadership consists almost exclusively of 
academics with a science or engineering background who 
took their diplomas at Francophile universities (Tawil 
1998, 14). A key leader was Malek Bennabi, who was in 
favor of a democracy that took account of Islamic val-
ues. His first principle was that God does not change the 
situation of a people until that people is prepared to do 
something about the situation itself. He was also known 
81IJCV : Vol. 1 ( 1) 2007, pp. 76–88Khadija Katja Wöhler-Khalfallah: Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia — Claim and Reality
for seeking to hold his own society responsible for the 
sorry state of affairs. His criticism was aimed especially at 
the Algerian elite, which he accused of failing to look after 
ordinary Algerians. He also criticized fundamentalists in 
the Middle East, who he said should not ascribe evil only 
to the materialistic, colonizing West but also to the East, 
which had meekly allowed itself to be colonized without 
putting up much resistance. In 1945, he followed his words 
with deeds and parted company with the Muslim Broth-
erhood, accusing them of misusing religion to pursue 
directly political aims. This, he said, had caused them to 
degenerate into a political instrument devoid of any civi-
lizing character (Labat 1995, 76ff.).
Nearly all the moderate Salafi leaders graduated from 
the Ben Badis Institute and most were born in the 1940s. 
Almost all had a religious education and they categorically 
refuse to speak French, which is seen as the language of 
the former colonists. Although their name suggests other-
wise, their teachings no longer have anything to do with 
those of the founders of the Salafiyya, who endeavored 
to adapt their interpretation of Islam to the modern age. 
This new ideological mixture combines elements of the 
writings of Ibn Taimiyya4, Hanbalism5, Wahhabism6, and 
Sayyid Qutb (Labat 1994, 44). Sayyid Qutb held the view 
that a human being may serve God alone and that people 
must not accept each other as masters in the place of God 
(Qutb 1994, 199). This Muslim Brother was also responsi-
ble for the terrorizing interpretation of Islam that excludes 
from the faith any Muslim society that does not live under 
a Caliphate (Qutb 1995), which would make it easy for 
militant forces to deliver it up to the terror of fanaticism. 
The new Salafis believe the West is to be seen solely as a 
threat to be repulsed. Their ideal is no longer the heyday 
of Islamic civilization in the High Middle Ages, but the 
original Muslim community of Mohammed and the 
four Rightly-Guided Caliphs. Philosophical and scientific 
tradition in Islam is rejected as heathen. Their Islam is an 
Islam that is simply bereft of the component of civilization. 
Their efforts are directed solely at establishing an ideology 
of struggle. Both moderate and extremist Salafis reject 
democracy because they believe that God alone can hold 
power, not the people (Tawil 1998, 15).
This conveys how explosive a construct the FIS was, given 
that the groups that joined it have very great problems 
even to accept each other. Many would have preferred to 
overthrow the state by force, but hoped that the FIS’s suc-
cess would give them an easy road to power.
3.1 Election process purely a choice of candidates
On closer scrutiny the apparent confusion that the FIS 
sows even in its program as regards its attitude to democ-
racy can be interpreted without ambiguity (cf. al-Mun-
quid7, October 19, 1989).
 
What the FIS is willing to give Algerians is a one-time 
election to choose between a theocracy and a secular state. 
If they were to choose a theocracy, there would be no legal 
way back. Certainly, this theocracy would permit elections 
with a choice of candidates. At best, the Algerians could 
choose between different parties with a connection to Is-
lam, but a socialist and laicist or liberal party, for instance, 
would no longer be permissible. Arguments generally put 
forward against a multi-party system include the fear that 
political parties will fracture the unity of the umma. In 
this context it should be noted that Islam emerged in a 
region inhabited by tribes that were often involved in cen-
turies-old feuds. For a time, at least, Mohammed succeed-
ed – in the name of unity of the umma – in overcoming 
the never-ending wars that had often rent entire families 
apart (Faath and Mattes 1992, 19). By using the fear of 
splits, dissension, and fratricidal war the fundamentalists 
succeed in portraying the party system as divisive rather 
4 Under the influence of the Christian crusades 
and the Mongol invasion, Ibn Taimiyya developed 
a theological line ascribing a special significance  
to jihad (holy war). 
 
5 The most recent and the smallest of the four of-
ficially recognized schools of law within Islam.  
Its founder leaned toward the Abbasids and the 
conservatives among them. Regarded as the strict-
est school, it placed severe restrictions on the use 
of rational methods to find justice and tried to 
align itself as closely as possible to the source texts. 
Wahhabism is based on this doctrine. 
 
6 A sect that originated in the eighteenth century, 
which takes Islam back to an idealized, primitive
“original” form, declares all post-Mohammedan 
interpretations of the source texts as null and void, 
proscribes any form of drug or intoxicant, and 
insists on archaic Arab methods of punishment 
such as the stoning of adulterers and chopping off 
the hands of thieves. 
 
7 F IS  party publication
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than conducive to peace, as a system in which personal 
vanities are nurtured while sight of higher national goals 
is lost (al-Munquid, February 22, 11–12).
Ali Ben Hadj, the second in the FIS’s two-man leader-
ship, even said that democracy is based on the view of 
the majority without taking account of the quality of that 
majority. He leveled the criticism that, because truth is 
established by the majority view, the leaders of democratic 
parties are only concerned with developing a program to 
satisfy the largest possible number of voters and that faith, 
honor, religion, etc. fall by the wayside in the process. In 
contrast, for supporters of the Sunna and the community, 
truth is established solely by way of legitimate reasoning 
and argumentation and not by the total influence exerted 
or the total votes cast (al-Munquid, August 9, 1990).
3.2 Who will interpret Islam?
FIS statements do not clarify whose job it is to interpret 
Islam or which body will be given the power to specify 
what conforms to Islam, nor whether or not this body 
would be subject to scrutiny by the people. The FIS politi-
cal program says nothing about this. However, suspicion is 
aroused by Ali Ben Hadj’s comments that the people lack 
the political maturity, the wisdom, and the far-sightedness 
to be allowed to decide this, so he could imagine a council 
of theologians with the job of settling these matters. How-
ever, he fails to mention who would be allowed to elect 
this council and whether it would be subject to any form 
of popular scrutiny (Ben Hadj, alias Abu Abd al-Fattah, 
al-Munquid, August 9, 1990, 3–4).
3.3 Who will oversee the overseers?
The only surveillance mechanism mentioned in the FIS 
program is the so-called hisba market police, which is 
to be upgraded to a force that polices morals. As well as 
checking civil servants’ integrity, it would examine the 
morality of the lifestyle of single mothers whose husbands 
have died or left them before they receive any entitlement 
to welfare benefits. Bassam Tibi places the meaning of 
hisba in its proper context. He writes: “In classical Islam, 
hisba means that the Caliph can watch to make sure his 
ra’iyya (subjects) follow the rules of Islam, primarily that 
they do not deceive or defraud, and can call them to ac-
count. In present-day Egypt, however, hisbah means that 
every Muslim can “snoop around” in the life of another 
Muslim and accuse him of breaking the shari’a.” Tibi says 
this amounts to encouraging people to inform, which is a 
punishable offense in Islamic law (Tibi 2000, 103 and 106).
 
The problem with this kind of surveillance is that anyone 
who does not concur with the state doctrine can be swept 
aside as having deserted the faith, however good a Muslim 
he may be. With the exception of one single article, no 
issue of al-Munquid contains any differentiated discussion 
of the advantages of division of powers, the rule of law, 
equal rights, and political equality, nor does the FIS party 
program. Yet not even from the viewpoint of Islam can 
there be any objection to these control mechanisms, given 
that they support just treatment of individual members of 
society and ensure that arbitrary use of power is averted 
(discussed in detail in Wöhler-Khalfallah 2004).
3.4 The sharia as a constitution
As long as the issue of genuine control mechanisms is 
ignored the best legislation is of no avail unless it is guar-
anteed to apply to all and to be implemented in an equal 
manner.
This insight alone enables one to imagine the flaw in the 
thinking of many fundamentalists when they insist that 
only a higher, divine law that is above human weaknesses 
(such as corruptibility, arbitrary use of power, etc.) will be 
able to bring justice to Muslims. Whether deliberately or 
not, they overlook the fact that this law, too, will have to 
be interpreted by humans and can fall victim to abuse in 
the process, and that people can force their own opin-
ion on others in the name of a higher being. It might be 
almost impossible to stop that type of abuse in the absence 
of entirely earthly control mechanisms.
The example of Sudan shows the ease with which the 
sharia can be abused. Traditionally, prior to contact with 
European influences, the principle of repentance always 
played a role in the application of the sharia. Even in 
cases of adultery there was seldom recourse to stoning 
because the culprit was given the opportunity to repent. 
In Numeiry’s interpretation of the sharia, which Hassan 
al-Turabi, who is often seen in the West as modern and 
liberal, also approved – despite initial reservations – after 
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being brought into government, even small-time thieves 
have their limbs chopped off for petty theft (one more 
limb for each offense). Meanwhile, new legislation has 
benefited the Muslim Brotherhood, with new banking 
regulations giving it economic power that it has channeled 
into targeted loans to members of the Brotherhood and 
speculation on the grain market (Köndgen 1992, 46).
In Iran the Islamic regime’s potential for abuse lies pri-
marily in the circumstance that the heart of the Iranian 
constitution, the wilayat faqih, or guardianship of the 
jurists, gives absolute authority to a single theologian. 
Although the state founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
accepted the formal institutions of a parliamentary de-
mocracy, he created for himself an office that stands above 
all elected bodies, thereby neutralizing the constitution’s 
republican element (Kermani 2001, 46). That has given 
rise to the unusual situation where “followers of the 
party of God” (Ansar-e Hezbollah) the radicals among 
Islamist groups in Iran, now violently storm theological 
institutions because these institutions are calling ever 
more audibly for a separation between religion and state 
(Kermani 2001, 32). Kermani suggests that the arguments 
put forward by these new theologians mark the decline 
in religiousness that has been noticeable since the Islamic 
Revolution. If Islam is identified with the state, he says, “it 
is held responsible for every injustice for which the state is 
responsible. This results in the spread of atheism, society 
loses its moral values and religious hypocrisy and open 
bigotry are omnipresent. They analyze the ideologization 
of Islam, in which they themselves were involved, as a 
misunderstanding that arose during the course of forced, 
superficial modernization under the Pahlavi dynasty. This 
smacks of the march through Hell that is necessary in 
order to return to Paradise by the back door. By turning 
away from the Islamism of their own intellectual fathers 
the self-styled religious enlighteners are returning under 
completely changed auspices to the apolitical religiousness 
of their grandparents” (Kermani 2001, 51).
At this point it should be noted that even with the best 
of wills the “democracy” the FIS talked about until 1992 
cannot be described as such. It renounces any form of 
counterchecks, and that would open the door wide to 
arbitrary use of power and ideological despotism. In any 
case, in Algeria after three years of civil war, the remains 
of the FIS that had refused to condemn GIA terrorism 
came to the conclusion that only a liberal democracy with 
all its control mechanisms could bring peace to the coun-
try. Even the bitter opponent of democracy Ali Ben Hadj 
conceded at negotiations in Rome that the Koran and the 
Sunna could not serve as a constitution and should only 
to be referred to for inspiration in drafting a constitution 
with which all Algerian groups could agree. The FIS also 
recognized the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Impligazio and Giro 1998, 121 and 136).
We are unable to clarify here whether these concessions were 
made out of realization and conviction rather than merely 
for reasons of political pragmatism, because the FIS has been 
banned since 1992 and forbidden to participate in politics. Its 
two leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Ben Hadj were released 
from a twelve-year jail sentence only on July 2, 2003, on con-
dition that they refrain from future political activity.
4. Rached Ghannouchi’s and ANNAHDA’s Ideas on the State
Unlike the FIS, which was an umbrella organization 
bringing together very different orientations, Tunisia’s 
MTI (Mouvement de la tendance islamique), now known 
as the ANNAHDA party, was consistent within itself. 
The MTI was not founded directly. It came into being 
when three sympathizers with Pakistan’s Tabligh Group8, 
which began missionizing in Tunisia in around 1966– 67, 
joined forces. They were Sheikh bin Milad, Rached 
Ghannouchi, subsequently their president and their most 
important thinker, and Ahmida Enneifar.
Interest in Ghannouchi was aroused especially by the fact 
that, unlike other fundamentalist movements’ leaders, he 
8 These itinerant preachers who went out into the 
world in the 1960s to spread their interpretation of 
Islam were for a long time looked on benevolently 
as “Jehovah’s Witnesses of Islam” (Der Spiegel, 
January 10, 2005). However, the history of how
they originated and the careers of their spiritual 
leadership show a striking link with the Deoband 
schools, where the Taliban among others were 
educated (cf. http://islamonline.net/fatwa/arabic/
FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=11300).
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declared himself to be in favor of liberal democracy in a 
spectacular way that grabbed the media’s attention. He 
comes across generally as very pragmatic and life-affirm-
ing. He insists that the arts must not be neglected and 
criticizes people who pursue religious studies in an out-
moded way so that young people fail to see the sense of re-
ligion. His insistence on social justice made the movement 
attractive to young people and earned him a reputation as 
a closet Marxist among his critics. He likes to make play of 
this accusation in order to underscore that his politics are 
relevant to the present day.
He warns against the oft-repeated assertion that the West 
is in decline. This charge, he says, only serves as a seda-
tive for Muslims. Although he, too, believes that West is 
in a process of breakdown, at least on the moral plane, he 
sees little comfort in that for those whose decline is even 
further advanced. Unlike his colleagues, he warns against 
rejecting outright all ideas that come from the West, espe-
cially democracy. At the very least, he says, they must be 
given proper scrutiny. He starts by explaining the guid-
ing thought that drives the West. The central idea in the 
West, he says, is belief in human beings, belief that human 
beings exist in themselves and for themselves and are the 
measure of all things, that humans can control their world 
and their destiny, understand their world and master it 
completely.
The positive fruits of that kind of belief, he says, are that it 
liberates human beings from the feeling of powerlessness 
and steers their thoughts into practical, functional paths. 
It gives them belief in progress, tenacity in mastering the 
unknown, and a sense of the values of the day and the im-
portance of human dignity and freedom that is reflected 
at the political level in the form of democracy and respect 
for human rights. Ghannouchi qualifies this by saying 
that this belief also has negative aspects such as the lack of 
interest in anything beyond the material. The consequence, 
he says, is that the intellectual and spiritual life of the 
West lags remarkably behind its material progress, which 
is why life takes its course amid a decadent hedonism 
devoid of any convincing vision of the true meaning of life. 
This indicates that Ghannouchi is discovering democratic 
mechanisms for his concept of a state based on Islamic 
values, while rejecting democracy’s secular side because it 
allows a permissiveness that he sees as jeopardizing, if not 
destroying, civilization.
However, Ghannouchi levels the criticism that liberal 
democracy is only applied within national boundaries, 
whereas internationally the laws of nature apply (Ghan-
nouchi 1993, 85 f.). He is alluding to globalization mecha-
nisms and Western interventionism. As he sees it, the 
problem lies not in the ideals or mechanisms of democracy 
but in some aspects of the philosophy in which these 
ideals originated. His view is that liberal democracy is in-
fluenced by western philosophies such as those of Darwin, 
Hegel, and Nietzsche that justify and legitimize this kind 
of conduct by the stronger toward the weaker. He says that 
democratic governments all over the world are involved 
in oppression and even genocide, showing the inhuman 
side of western democracies (Tamimi 2001, 87). Ghan-
nouchi complains that democracy has not yet succeeded in 
preventing peoples from attacking each other or deception 
and economically motivated encroachments and preda-
tion. Ghannouchi believes it is essential for nations to 
overcome their egoisms and to strive for a single humanity, 
in other words that all people all over the world, regardless 
of nationality, are entitled to the same rights, in practice as 
well as in theory. In his view, materialist philosophy is seen 
as the only basis for the values of the liberal democratic 
system and is thus responsible for the West’s oppressive 
behavior outside its own borders. As an Islamic alternative, 
he supports a democracy built on ethical, that is religious, 
values.
He calls for an attack on one person to be considered as 
an attack on the whole of humanity. For Ghannouchi it is 
clear that democracy can contribute toward, indeed is fun-
damental to, developing one of the best political systems, 
as long as it is accompanied by a universal philosophy that 
respects human life. According to him it is still the best 
political system that the human mind ever created, even 
without having been realized in an Islamic democracy. 
He says it was unforgivable of fundamentalists to reject 
it wholesale on the grounds that it originated in Western 
minds. On the contrary, he says, consideration should be 
given as to how it could be put to the use of the Islamic 
mind so as to put its values to best advantage (Ghannouchi 
1993, 87).
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4.1 Discrepancy between Ghannouchi’s public statements and his writings
When Ghannouchi was once asked at a reading whether 
he would allow a communist party to remain politically 
active if he came to power, he castigated the questioner, 
saying that his question could only have come from a pa-
ternalistic way of thinking. He said he had no intention of 
imposing a guardianship on the people and it was time for 
fundamentalists to break away from this paternalistic atti-
tude and to start crediting people with the ability to make 
the right choice (el-Affendy 1987). In an interview with a 
Kuwaiti magazine he said: “We entered the political arena 
in Tunisia to fight for freedoms and not to establish an 
Islamic state.” To the horror of his interviewer, a tradition-
alist fundamentalist, he added: “We must respect the will 
of the masses if they decide to choose a different path from 
ours. We are not people’s guards. So if our society decides 
one day to become atheist or even communist, what could 
we do?” (el-Affendy 1987).
All these comments certainly helped to reinforce his repu-
tation as a champion of liberal values. However, a some-
what critical look at his well-known book “Al-Hurriyat 
al-’amma fi d-daula al-islamiya” (General freedoms in the 
Islamic state) leads one to envisage something rather more 
restrictive.
Ghannouchi’s explicit attitude toward the apostate is 
revealing. He regards voluntary, deliberate turning away 
from Islam to unbelief, on the basis of which fundamen-
tal guidelines of Islam as regards faith, law, or rite are 
rejected, as a political offense. The Islamic right to free-
dom and security does not include the freedom to turn 
away from the faith. The offense lies in the splitting away, 
an act of “mutiny” and “treason” that must be punished 
within the context of the state’s responsibility to maintain 
the community and law and order (Tamimi 2001, 78). This 
opinion shows that he is not really at all willing to accept 
the consequences of giving society the freedom to choose 
between opposing social concepts.
4.2 Islamic democracy within the limits of what is permissible under  
the sharia
Ghannouchi’s statement on the role in his “Islamic 
democracy” of the limits set by the sharia is unmistak-
able, because in his view no political concept that moves 
outside the sharia can be regarded as Islamic. From an 
Islamic view, such a concept would be plainly illegitimate 
(Tamimi 2001, 90). According to Ghannouchi the author-
ity of the sharia is higher than any other authority in 
Muslim society. That statement is unequivocal.
4.3 A multi-party system that permits only parties that accept the Islamic 
order and act according to it
Ghannouchi is very cautious in his utterances about the 
multi-party system. Like many other fundamentalists, he 
expresses concerns that the plethora of movements could 
split the umma. However, he sees in it a positive aspect of 
competition, albeit one that must follow the basic rules 
of constructive cooperation. Yet unmistakably audible is 
the caveat that he has no intention of allowing parties that 
reject the religious order of Islam as the highest regulatory 
element of a society to participate in any way in shaping 
political life. In his view, the only option for anyone who 
wants to be involved in political events is to convert to 
Islam. On the other hand, he will allow non-Muslims to be 
involved in Muslim parties provided that they respect the 
value concepts of Islamic society. However, they are not to 
be given access to leading posts in government (Ghannou-
chi 1993, 292ff.).
4.4 Ghannouchi’s design for an Islamic division of powers
The above remarks should have demonstrated that Ghan-
nouchi does not intend to establish a liberal democracy in 
the western sense. Nonetheless, he has certainly given very 
considerable thought to how the rule of law can be ensured, 
at least theoretically, in a religious system that has been 
shown in this study to be particularly susceptible to abuse 
of power. Ghannouchi recognizes the danger arising from 
the circumstance that the sharia has to be interpreted and 
that there is therefore a risk of abuse of power through in-
terest-led interpretation. His proposed solution for stopping 
this monopolization is for parties with different kinds of 
ijtihad (judgment) to compete with each other and to leave 
it to the people choose the version that suits them (Tamimi 
2001, 83 and 99ff.). In the event that only interpretations are 
proposed that the people refuse to accept at any price, they 
are be provided with a means to reject the proposals.
Thus, on critical reflection, what Ghannouchi intends is a 
state regulatory element with power-limiting mechanisms 
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to ensure legal certainty within the framework of reli-
gious laws. The only logical explanation for his statements 
concerning his willingness always to give Tunisians the 
full right to opt, if need be, for atheism or communism is 
that this decision-making freedom is to be granted only 
for the first election that Tunisians face, that is the elec-
tion for or against a religiously motivated state system. If 
in this election they were to opt for a secular model, he 
would respect their choice. However, if they chose an 
Islamic model, its laws would come into force irrevocably. 
In principle, given his religiously oriented starting point 
he cannot be reproached for holding this opinion. He can 
only be accused of keeping his followers in the dark and 
of leading them astray with spectacular, media attention-
grabbing statements that convey the impression that he 
is a liberal thinker. Above all, a state that defined itself by 
way of a certain religion would only be the state of those 
citizens who professed their faith in the state religion. This 
would give rise to a permanent potential for arbitrary use 
of power against minorities. That state’s democracy would 
be an Islamic democracy, but it would certainly not be a 
liberal democracy.
Ghannouchi’s less well-publicized activities show that, as 
regards his attitude toward democracy and his call for a 
universal humanity, caution is called for. He has lived in 
exile in London since the early 1990s and is now a member 
of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, which is 
headed by Yussuf al-Qaradawi and is close to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The council’s main aim is to regulate the life 
of Muslims in Europe according to the stipulations of the 
sharia (European Council for Fatwa and Research 2006). 
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMR I 2004) 
reports that as recently as 2004 Qaradawi himself issued 
a fatwa that allows the killing of Muslim intellectuals as 
apostates, published in Al-Ahram Al-Arabi on July 3 that 
year. Some self-styled liberal Arab thinkers report that 
Ghannouchi himself recently issued a fatwa permitting 
the killing of all Israeli civilians. The justification given 
was that there are no civilians in Israel because the popu-
lation – men, women and children – are reserve soldiers of 
the army and therefore to be killed (MEMR I 2004).
It can be assumed that approaching 30 percent of Tuni-
sians now sympathize with Ghannouchi’s ANNAHDA 
movement. Torture is the order of the day in Tunisia’s 
prisons and is aimed at all forms of opposition, both lib-
eral and religious. Students and the middle class especially 
follow the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with keen interest, 
which makes these groups susceptible to radical ideas 
(Schirra 2002). Added to this is the desolate economic 
situation. A mere glance at the ANNAHDA website gives 
a sense of the strong radicalization. It reproduces a tract 
by Hassan al-Banna (1906 –1948), the founder of Egypt’s 
Muslim Brotherhood, entitled “Are we a people capable of 
action?” This not only legitimizes jihad as a defensive war, 
but also makes campaigns of conquest socially acceptable 
again (Al-Banna 2006). The French investigating judge 
Jean-Francois Ricard foresaw back in 2002 that Tunisian 
terrorists would before long provide the coming genera-
tion of al-Qaida (Schirra 2002).
5. Summary and Outlook
This article has discussed democratic elements in early 
Islamic sources and in the programs of the FIS and AN-
NAHDA. According to historic writings, Islam includes 
the principle of democratic consensus, the principle of 
consultation, freedom of opinion, and an understand-
ing that the sources of Islamic jurisdiction are subject to 
interpretation, that the sharia can be changed, and that re-
ligious authorities’ power to issue instructions on worldly 
matters is limited. These are the type of expectations that 
fundamentalist parties arouse when they speak of an 
Islamic Caliphate as a state system. However, in practice 
democracy as it features in the ideas of the FIS provides 
for only a one-time choice between a theocracy and a sec-
ular state. There is no way back from a theocracy, and in a 
theocracy it is only possible to elect different individuals 
and parties from an Islamic spectrum. The interpretation 
of Islam is to be left to a clergy in power. There is no provi-
sion for mechanisms to control the organs of state or to 
prevent arbitrary use of power. Ghannouchi, the spiritual 
leader of ANNAHDA, recognized long ago the impor-
tance of democratic institutions and, especially, the need 
for a division of powers as the only effective means of pre-
venting despotism. Yet he vehemently rejects a separation 
of religion and state even though he often presents himself 
in a media attention-grabbing way as a supporter of liberal 
characteristics of democracy. In fact, he regards apostasy 
as an offense that he would like to see punished. He sees 
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democratic scope, including competition between parties, 
as permissible only within the framework of the sharia. A 
noticeable tendency toward a hardening of positions gives 
cause for thought. It finds expression especially in identifi-
cation with the Palestine conflict and leads Ghannouchi to 
take an irreconcilable stance in this regard.
The above examination of the fundamentalist parties of 
Algeria and Tunisia conveys an idea of the process of self-
discovery that the Islamic world is currently engaged in.  
It should not be forgotten, however that groups relating to 
political Islam only constitute one part of the population 
of the Muslim world, even though it currently seems to be 
becoming more and more significant.
If they are to achieve social peace in the long term, they 
will not be able to avoid coming to terms with other 
political groupings. Likewise, in the long term the path to 
liberal democracy will be unavoidable. Yet this does not 
mean that the values by which different Eastern societies 
are guided will have to correspond to Western approaches 
in every respect. Not all democracies are identical, even 
in the West. Each country has agreed standards that best 
suit its nature, its culture, its history, its national character, 
and its ethnic make-up. In the same way, Muslim societies 
too will find their own way and may have to fight to secure 
it. However, rather than assist this process, self-serving 
Western intervention can only reverse fragile advances 
and hand the arguments to the fanatics.
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